Financing the budget deficit in the Philippines by Remolona, Eli H.
 
 
 
 
 
 
PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
Working Paper 85-02 
 
 
 
FINANCING THE BUDGET DEFICIT 
IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
Eli H. Remolona∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 The views expressed in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Institute. 
 
∗Assistant Professor, School of Economics, University of the Philippines.  
FINANCING THE BUDGET DEFICIT 
IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 
 
1. Introduction        1 
 
2. Background literature       4 
 
2.1  The Friedman-Tobin Debate     5 
2.2  The Barro Critique      6 
2.3  Application to LDCs      7 
 
3. An Overview of the Budget Deficit     9 
 
  3.1  Measuring the Budget Deficit     9 
  3.2  The Use of Base Money Creation             12 
  3.3  Sources of Deficit Financing              14 
 
4. Optimal Deficit Finance in a Repressed Credit Market           18 
 
  4.1  The Existing Distortions               19 
  4.2  The Creation of Currency              20 
  4.3  Domestic Open-Market Borrowing             21 
  4.4  Foreign Borrowing               22 
  4.5  Reserve Requirements               24 
  4.6  Evaluating the Philippine Record             25 
 
5. Optimal Deficit Finance After Liberalization             26 
 
  5.1  The Capital Market              28 
  5.2  Household Welfare              30 
  5.3  Specifying Revenues              33 
  5.4  The Optimal Policy Mix              34 
 
6. Estimating the Parameters for the Financing Rule          37 
 
  6.1  The Formation of Expectations            38 
  6.2  Estimating the Demand Functions           41 
  6.3  Applying the Elasticities             43 
 
7. Conclusion               45 
 
Appendix:  Specifying the Inflation Tax for Time Consistency         48 
 
References                53 
Financing the Budget Deficit 
in the Philippines 
 
 
Eli M. Remolona∗  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The last year the Philippines saw a budget surplus for the national government was 
1974, just after the first oil price shock.  Since then the budget deficits have been chronic.  In 
1981, for example, the recorded deficit amounted to 4.0 percent fo GNP and 37.2 percent of 
private savings. 
 
This study examines how those deficits were financed in the past and proposes a rule 
for financing them in the future.  The size of the deficit itself seems to have been managed 
for stabilization purposes, but little attention has been paid to the way it has been financed in 
spite of the enormous amount of resources involved and the far-reaching implications on 
economic efficiency.  In the first instance, of course, the national government finances its 
deficit by issuing debt.  But it makes a great deal of difference who ends up holding such 
debt. 
We can in fact distinguish between four basic methods of financing a budget deficit: 
(a) the creation of currency, when the Central Bank holds part of the newly issued  
debt, thereby monetizing it, and it ends up in the hands of the public as freshly 
printed money or in bank vaults as excess reserves; 
(b) raising reserve requirements, when banks are made to hold additional required 
reserves in the form of cash, balances with the Central Bank, or eligible 
government securities; 
(c) domestic open-market borrowing, when government debt is voluntarily held by 
the banks or the public for the interest it pays; and 
(d) foreign borrowing, when the national government borrows abroad. 
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 2 
The distinction between (a) and (b) reflects recent developments in monetary theory (Fama 
1980 and McKinnon 1981), in which the former is seen to correspond to the inflation tax and 
the latter to a tax on financial intermediation.  In the case of (c) and (d), while both may be 
treated together as a tax on savings, a distinction between them seems in order because of the 
importance in the Philippines of the balance of payments and the need to service external 
debt. 
 
  The theory developed below chooses the optimal mix of policy instruments by 
maximizing the welfare of a representative household subject to financing a given budget 
deficit.  It is shown that in credit markets repressed by interest ceilings, such as the ceilings 
the Philippines had for most of the 1970s, financing a budget deficit calls for heavy reliance 
on reserve requirements.  Under interest repression, reserve requirements serve as a tax to 
soak up rents accruing to those borrowers who are privileged to have access to cheap capital.  
The other instruments of deficit financing would only exacerbate the existing distortions.  
The reserve tax, however, is only a way to make the best of bad situation.  Once credit 
markets are liberalized, such a tax introduces its own distortions and it should therefore be 
phased out then. 
 
  The liberalization of credit markets means the optimal policy mix will consist 
only of the inflation tax and open-market borrowing.  The precise mix will depend on various 
elasticities of demand.  In this paper, an attempt is made to get at those elasticities by 
estimating demand functions for money and for future wealth.  The resulting calculations 
show that even with credit liberalization, there would still be no room for the inflation tax.  
The budget deficit at its present levels should be financed entirely by open-market 
borrowing. 
 
  There are six sections to follow.  Section 2 is a brief review of background 
literature.  Section 3 is an overview of the Philippine experience in financing its budget 
deficit in the twelve years between 1970 and 1981.  Section 4 develops a theory of deficit 
finance for the case of a credit market repressed by an interest ceiling.  Section 5 provides an 
analysis of the same problem for the case of a credit market that has now been freed from 
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interest repression.  Section 6 reports the estimates of the demand functions for money and 
for future wealth and applies those estimates to illustrate the financing rule derived in the 
previous section.  Section 7 concludes with suggestions for further work. 
 
2. Background Literature 
 
The standard textbook analysis of the financing of a budget deficit distinguishes only 
between money creation and debt finance.1  According to this analysis, an increase in the 
deficit financed entirely by public borrowing shifts the IS curve to the right, resulting in some 
output expansion together with a higher nominal interest rate in the short run when price are 
supposedly fixed.  If instead this increase in the deficit as financed by money creation, the 
LM curve shifts to the right as well.  This shift in the LM curve has a dampening effect on 
the interest rate, and hence the output effect must now be greater because there would then be 
less crowding out of investment. 
 
2.1 The Friedman-Tobin debate 
 
There was for while a lively debate between Milton Friedman and James Tobin as 
to the relative magnitudes of those effects.2 Friedman (1971) minimized the effect of 
a debt-financed deficit, but that effect Tobin (1971) attributed to the unrealistic 
assumption of a vertical LM curve. Friedman denied (1972) this charge by asserting 
instead a fairly flat IS curve.  However, the two did seem to agree on the sizeable 
output effects of money creation.   
 
Moreover, Friedman (1971, 1972) seems to have placed more emphasis on 
changes in the price level, which in the longer run would tend to shift the LM curve 
back to offset the initial effect on real output while leaving nominal output at a 
permanently higher level.  Tobin (1972) did agree that the more sensitive prices are to 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Dornbusch and Fischer (1981, Chapter 14). 
2 This debate was sparked by the publication in 1971 of Friedmans theoretical framework using the 
Hicksian IS-LM apparatus.  This exchange was published in the form of a symposium of papers in the September-
October 1972 issue of the Journal of Political Economy. 
 4 
aggregate demand, the steeper the LM curve.  Hence, the difference was only one of 
emphasis with respect to price changes.  The standard textbook analysis now takes 
account of these price changes by incorporating a Phillips curve.3 
 
2.2 The Barro critique 
 
In a very influential paper, Robert Barro (1974) pointed out that the financing of a 
budget deficit by the issue of public debt would raise output only if such debt was 
perceived as net wealth by the private sector, since only then could aggregate demand 
be increased.  Barro then showed that if there were operative inter-generational 
transfers, public debt would not be so perceived, because the private sector would 
discount their wealth by the future tax liabilities needed to service that debt.  This 
conclusion is very damaging to the standard analysis because it means that budget 
deficits are completely neutral, and in particular not at all expansionary.4 
 
Barros conclusion, however, depends also on the assumption of a perfect capital 
market.  In the fragmented capital markets of LDCs, the government can often offer 
debt more efficiently than can other sectors and it can thus create net wealth.  
Moreover, Barros results depend on the assumption of lump-sum taxes to service 
public debt.  If taxes were distortionary, as in fact they are, then even if there were no 
wealth effects, there would still be substitution effects from taxes needed to service 
public debt, and the neutrality result would be lost.  In this case, there would be 
grounds for balancing the distortionary effects of a debt-financed deficit against the 
distortionary effects of inflationary finance. 
 
                                                 
3 See Chapter 11 of Dornbusch and Fischer (1981).  John Power (1975) proposes an ingenious alternative 
in which prices depend on marginal costs and the degree of monopoly, so that the price level  would rise as capacity 
output is approached. 
4 This result, Barro apparently believes, applies also to budget deficits financed by money creation.  This is 
the impression one gets from Barros (1977) empirical work, I which he shows that only unanticipated changes in 
the money stock affect real income.  Barros work is part of the so-called Rational Expectations School, which 
assumes that agents use information efficiently in forming expectations and that markets always clear (see Sargent 
and Wallace 1976). 
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2.3 Application to LDCs 
 
Even if the IS-LM analysis of financing a budget deficit survives Barros attack, it 
may not be so resilient against the harsh terrain of LDC economies.  There are at least 
three major problems in the application of such a standard framework to a country 
like the Philippines: 
(a) First, the tools of monetary policy may be difficult to apply with the 
required degree of  precision.  The absence of well-developed capital 
markets in LDCs makes it hard to conduct open-market operations.  
Furthermore, the weakness of information systems in those countries 
delays the recognition of stabilization problems.  Finally, the 
fragmentation of markets could mean that policy effects would have 
long and unpredictable lags. 
(b) Second, the underlying model may not even be appropriate.  John 
Power (1977), for example, contends that wages in the modern sector 
are determined by institutional factors leading to Marxian, rather than 
Keynesian, unemployment.  It has also been pointed out that output 
fluctuations in the LDCs depend largely on supply factors rather than 
on aggregate demand. 
(c) Finally, efficiency rather than stabilization may be the overriding 
concern.  Ronald McKinnon (1973) and Edward Shaw (1973), for 
example, argue that with fragmented and repressed capital markets 
the major aim of monetary policy should be the development and 
liberalization of these markets.  Similarly, Power (1977) emphasizes 
the capital-intensive bias of the existing tariff protection system and 
points out the importance of trade liberalization. 
 
3. An Overview of the Budget Deficit, 1970-1981 
 
The national government has been incurring budget deficits at least since 1975.  
Going by the official government accounts, there was a small surplus in 1973 and 1974.  
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Those were the two years of the first oil price shock, when the price of imported crude 
quadrupled.  After a small deficits in 1975, the deficits became chronic for three years, 
averaging close to P72.5 billion a year.  Then in 1979, the year of the next oil price shock, 
the deficit fell to less than P0.5 billion.  In the two final years covered by this study, the 
deficit rebounded with a vengeance, reaching record levels of P4.0 billion and P12.2 billion.  
The latter figure amounted to 4.0 percent of GNP. 
 
3.1 Measuring the Budget Deficit 
 
In principle, the budget deficit as recorded in the official government accounts 
should correspond to the change in outstanding national government debt as recorded 
in the public debt accounts.  In fact the numbers are quite different.  There are at least 
two reasons for the divergence.  First, the government could issue more debt than is 
needed to cover the deficit in order to build up its deposit balances with the banking 
system.  Second, there could be a difference in timing between the recording of 
government receipts and expenditures, whether on a cash or obligations basis, and the 
recording of debt issue by the Treasury.5 
 
We would expect the government to draw down its deposit balances when it 
wishes to refrain from issuing too much debt to finance a deficit.  Conversely we 
would expect it to accumulate such balances during surplus years and even to retire 
bonds issued earlier.  In practice, however, this has not been the case.  In the 12-year 
period under study, only in 1976 and 1977 did the government draw down its deposits 
to finance part of its deficit.  The rest of the time, it issued more debt than the deficit 
and used the excess funds to build up its deposits. 
 
Unfortunately, adjustments to take account of such government cash management 
do not bring the recorded official deficits very much closer to the recorded changes in 
public debt.  Table 3.1 shows that the unexplained residuals can be quite larger, often 
even exceeding the official deficit figures.  Moreover, it does make a difference 
                                                 
5 We are indebted to John Power for pointing this out. 
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which numbers one looks at.  If it is the changes in public debt that one looks at, then 
in no year was there a surplus in the entire period under study.  The deficit is lowest 
in 1971 when it was just about half a billion pesos.  This time there is little 
correspondence with the oil price shocks.  The surge in the numbers in the final years 
becomes more striking.  In 1980 and 1981, the deficit would represent 5.3 and 5.5 
percent of GNP respectively, dramatizing apparent attempts by authorities at 
countercyclical policy, those being recession years. 
 
            Table 3.1.   The Budget Deficit as Officially Recorded, as Including Government  
  Cash Management, as the Change in Public Debt, and the  
  Unexplained Residual  (in Millions of Pesos) 
 
 
Year 
 
Officially 
Recorded 
 
Including Cash 
Management 
 
Change 
in Public Debt 
 
Unexplained 
Residual 
 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
 
 
             (59) 
            183 
         1,011 
        (2,090) 
        (2,442) 
            948 
         2,229 
         2,723 
         2,456 
            489 
        4,054 
       12,153 
        
 
                326 
                221 
             1,372 
                381 
                690 
             1,290 
             1,594 
             1,404 
             4,651 
             3,744 
             5,414 
            15,418 
 
             1,604 
                508 
             2,115 
             1,693 
             2,738 
             3,765 
             1,950 
             4,425 
             6,761 
             2,892 
            14,015 
            16,677 
 
         1,278 
            289 
            743 
         1,312 
         2,357 
         2,556 
            356 
         3,021 
         2,110 
           (852) 
         8,001 
         1,259 
  Source of basic data:  Bureau of Treasury. 
 
For purposes of breaking the deficit down into its sources of financing, we shall 
use as our measure the change in public debt.  We do this only for reasons of 
consistency.  To break the deficit down into its sources of financing, we need to use 
figures on debt holdings by various sectors.  With the deficit itself based on debt 
figures from the same set of accounts, the numbers will add up.  On the other hand, if 
we defined the deficit in terms of the budgetary accounts, we would have to make an 
arbitrary decision as to which source of financing to take as the residual. 
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3.2 The Use of Base Money Creation 
 
When the Central Bank adds to its holdings of government debt, it creates base 
money in the form of either fresh currency or bank reserves.  Hence the part of the 
deficit financed by money creation corresponds to the increase in Central Bank 
holdings of government debt.  That the deficits seem to have been held down at the 
time of the oil price shocks might indicate attempts to control the inflationary effects 
of those shocks by preventing monetary accommodation. 
 
The relation between deficits and money creation, however, is not clear from the 
evidence.  In 1970, for example, debt issue was P1.6 billion which base money 
creation was P0.7 billion.  Then in 1972 debt issue rose to P2.1 billion and yet base 
money contracted by P0.6 billion. 
 
In an attempt to discover what it is that has guided monetary policy, we regressed 
base money creation on variables representing possible goals of stabilization and on 
the size of the deficit itself.6  Among our better results was the following: 
 
  ht = 0.07 + 5.04 gt-1   +  0.56 BuDt-1  +  0.29 πt-1 
                    (2.53)             (1.81)                 (0.88) 
 
                  + 0.07 ut-1    -  0.35 ht-1 
(0.71) (-1.28) 
 
R2 = 0.41            D.W. = 2.60               F = 1.29 
 
where  h  is  base  money creation,  g is the ratio of GNP to the  previous years GNP,    
BuD is the ratio of government expenditures to reserves, π is the inflation rate, u is 
the unemployment rate, the subscript t-1 indicates a one-year lag, and all the variables 
are in logarithms. 
 
 The t-values in parentheses indicate that only the income growth and budget 
deficit variables have coefficient significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed report, see Araneta (1983). 
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level.  The implication seems to be that the elasticity of base money creation with 
respect to budget deficits is about 56 percent.  On the other hand, the income variable 
had the wrong sign.  Moreover, the regression fails the F test.  When we added a 
dummy variables for the years of the oil price shocks, even the coefficient for the 
budget deficit became insignificant. 
 
3.3 Sources of Deficit Financing 
 
If we add up all the budget deficits in real terms for the 12 years of the study and 
do the same for base money creation, we will find that on the average only 16 percent 
of the deficit was monetized.  However, as Figure 1 shows, more than half of the 
monetized deficit ended up as required reserves.  Hence only 7 percent of the budget 
deficit was actually financed by the creation of currency in circulation and excess 
reserves.  To be sure the total amount of currency creation and the corresponding 
inflation tax during the period was greater than that, but the rest of it went not to 
financing the budget deficit but to Central Bank lending to financing institutions. 
 
The larger part of the deficit was not monetized, that is, most of the debt that was 
issued was not held by the Central Bank.  In fact, 46 percent of that debt went to 
foreign lending institutions, so that over half of the nonmonetized deficit was 
financed by foreign borrowing.  The rest of the deficit was financed largely by 
domestic open-market borrowing, with only 4 percent being added to the creation of 
required reserves in the form of eligible government securities.  These securities 
eligible to be held as required reserves constitute a tax on financial intermediation to 
the extent that they offer poorer yields than the government securities traded 
competitively on the open market. 
 
The most erratic source of deficit financing has been the creation of currency and 
excess reserves.  Indeed, as Table 3.2 shows, for half the years of the study, this was a 
negative source financing.  It financed as much as 33 percent of the deficit in 1974 
and detracted by as much as 29 percent in 1979 from deficit financing. 
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Neither the creation of required reserves nor domestic open-market borrowing show any 
consistent pattern as sources of deficit financing, except that the former tends to be used most 
when the deficit is not particularly large, as in 1971, 1973 and 1976.  The years of big deficits 
were the years in which the government turned to foreign borrowing quite heavily, as in 1975, 
1977, 1978 and 1981.  An exception was 1980 when the P14 billion deficit was financed mostly 
by domestic open-market borrowing.  But by and large, it seems that the national government 
spent more whenever it had access to foreign funds. 
 
 
Table 3.2  Sources of Budget Deficit Financing as Percentages of the Deficit 
 
 
 
Year 
Budget 
Deficita/ 
(Millions 
of Pesos) 
 
 
Currency 
Creation 
 
 
Required 
Reserves 
Creation 
 
 
Domestic 
Open 
Market 
Borrowing 
 
 
Foreign 
Borrowing 
 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
 
 
         1,604 
            508 
         2,115 
         1,693 
         2,738 
         3,765 
         1,950 
         4,425 
         6,761 
         2,892 
       14,015 
       16,677 
 
      (5.4) 
    (25.9) 
      32.0 
        6.4 
      33.1 
    (13.4) 
       8.0 
    (10.5) 
      (0.9) 
    (29.1) 
       9.7  
     24.9 
 
       25.1 
       39.2 
         7.0 
       36.2 
       17.3 
       11.1 
       39.3 
       26.6 
       14.9 
       21.9 
         4.3 
         6.6 
 
      (4.2) 
      43.1 
      29.6 
      58.5 
      30.4 
      41.6 
      46.2 
      28.4 
      31.2 
      53.4 
      59.3 
        9.1 
 
       84.5 
       46.6 
       31.4 
       (1.1) 
       19.2 
       60.6 
         6.4 
       55.5 
       54.8 
       53.7 
       26.7 
       59.3 
a/Measured as the change in outstanding debt of the national government. 
 
Source of basic data:  Central Bank and IMF 
 
 
4. Optimal Deficit Finance in a Repressed Credit Market 
 
We provide here a framework for the analysis of the choice among the four methods 
of deficit  financing that we have discussed.  To reiterate, these methods are:  (i)  the creation 
of currency in circulation and excess bank reserves; (ii) the creation of required bank 
reserves; (iii) domestic open-market borrowing; and (iv) foreign borrowing.  In this analysis, 
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we stress efficiency rather than stabilization as the objective of policy.  In particular we treat 
those methods of deficit finance as essentially distortionary taxes.  The idea is then simply to 
set these taxes so as to minimize the deadweight loss from financing a given budget deficit. 
 
Minimizing the deadweight loss of deficit finance is no more than an application to 
monetary policy of Ramseys (1927) classic approach to commodity taxation, in which taxes 
are chosen to maximize the utility of a representative consumer subject to the constraint of 
raising a fixed amount of tax revenue.  The e are new twists to the present application 
because we have to take account of the existing distortion of interest repression, and even 
when we assume this distortion has been removed, we still have to account for the special 
characteristics of the taxes used to finance a deficit. 
 
In this section, we take up the case in which such a distortion and another one with 
similar consequences are accepted as given. 
 
4.1 The Existing Distortions  
 
The existing distortions that present a major concern are those that arise from two 
particularly onerous systems of government intervention:  (i) the system of interest 
controls; and (ii) the system of tariff protection.  In the case of (i), Ronald McKinnon 
(1973) has shown how usury ceilings have served to fragment financial markets and 
to prevent interest rates from reflecting the scarcity cost of capital.  In the case of (ii), 
John Power (1977), among others, has pointed out how the tariff structure has 
resulted in widely varying effective rates of protection and in overinvestment in 
capital-intensive industries.  McKinnon and Power both reach the conclusion that the 
consequences of such financial and trade repression are the stifling of savings and the 
misallocation of capital. 
 
Indeed these consequences have not gone unnoticed in the Philippines.  The 
government here has actually responded to the problem by embarking on a program 
of gradual trade and financial liberalization.  The problem now is how to manage the 
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transition to a liberalized economy.  During this transition, as long as elements of 
repressive intervention remain, second-best policies continue to be called for.  As 
things turn out these existing distortions dominate all other considerations including 
the distortions the methods of deficit finance would otherwise impose.  Hence, the 
policies called for are specifically those that avoid exacerbating the existing 
distortions.  In other words, the financing of the budget should at the very least not 
discourage savings any further nor reinforce the patterns of investment engendered by 
financial  repression and tariff protection. 
 
In what follows, we evaluate each of the methods of deficit financing specifically 
in the presence of the existing distortions of financial repression and tariff protection.  
We save for the next section the analysis of the case in which those distortions no 
longer exist. 
 
4.2 The Creation of Currency 
 
Since financial repression is imposed mainly through ceilings on nominal interest 
rates, the creation of currency and excess reserves, to the extent that it is inflationary, 
can only make matters worse.  In such a repressed regime, inflation is a tax not only 
on real money balances but also on savings deposits.  In the 1970s, when nominal 
interest rates on savings deposits in the Philippines were kept at six to seven percent, 
the onset of double-digit inflation led to negative real rates of return.  Financial 
repression then was so severe because inflation rates were so high. 
 
Usury ceilings on interest rates favor the small class of borrowers who can borrow 
at the controlled rates at the expense of the large number of savers who have to settle 
for low returns.7  In such a situation, inflation is a particularly cruel tax, because by 
lowering real interest rates it raises the subsidy on the already privileged class of 
borrowers while making the burden on the small savers even more oppressive. 
                                                 
7 See Krugman (1978) for a simple yet vigorous analysis of the effect on saving and investment of usury 
ceilings. 
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Indeed in a regime of financial repression, the next best thing to actually freeing 
interest rates would be to reduce inflation.  If pursued far enough, such a policy can 
even serve to make the usury ceilings non-binding and to effectively eliminate an 
important instrument of financial repression.  In this case, however, not much 
seigniorage revenue can be extracted and the budget deficit will have to be financed 
largely by means than currency creation. 
 
4.3 Domestic Open-Market Borrowing 
 
Government debt must in one way or another be serviced by taxes in the future.  
To the extent that such taxes are anticipated, they are equivalent to a tax on savings 
and will induce a shift towards present consumption.  In a regime of trade and 
financial repression, where saving is already discouraged, such a tax would only 
aggravate the situation.  In such a regime, financing the budget deficit by means of 
domestic open-market borrowing should therefore be avoided. 
 
If the private sector has no access to the foreign capital market, the effect of 
public domestic borrowing must be to directly crowd out domestic investment.  In a 
repressed economy, the crowding out is not necessarily through higher interest rates, 
since those rates are largely controlled, but through reducing the amount of rationed 
credit available to private investors.  This amount is reduced not only because of what 
the government appropriates for itself but also because the flow of savings is reduced 
in anticipation of future tax liabilities. 
 
Note, however, that when the government borrows by requiring financial 
institutions to hold its debt as reserves, the effect is not quite the same.  The effect 
this time, as will be discussed later, is not to tax savings but to tax loans. 
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4.4 Foreign Borrowing 
 
If domestic open-market borrowing should be avoided, more so foreign 
borrowing.  Whether the government borrows locally or abroad, the debt has to be 
serviced by future taxes, but servicing foreign debt must somehow entail taxes that 
are more burdensome and the more painful the measures that will have to be 
instituted in the future to pay for that deficit and the greater will be the tax burden on 
present savings. 
 
Moreover, the system of tariff protection through its effect on the exchange rate 
invariably results in an overvalued currency and therefore a persistent difficulty of 
raising the foreign exchange needed to service foreign debt. 
 
4.5 Reserve Requirements 
 
We are left with just one instrument with which to finance the budget deficit.  
Fortunately this last one suits our purposes.  The reserve requirement is a tax on 
financial intermediation as long as the forms of government debt used as reserve 
assets yield lower rates of return than the rates that prevail in the market. 
 
The effect of this tax, as McKinnon (1981) has pointed out, is to widen the wedge 
between deposit rates and loan rates.  In a liberalized economy, the resulting disparity 
in rates of return is inefficient because it distorts investment decisions, and this 
distortion is a strong case against the reserve tax.  For an already distorted economy, 
however, this tax turns out to be a good second-best measure and therefore more 
discouraging to savings.  The reason for this has to do with the perverse tendency of a 
repressed economy to incur current account deficits. 
 
The current account deficit may be expressed as the difference between domestic 
investment and domestic saving.  Here domestic saving could be viewed as consisting 
of private saving and government saving.  A budget deficit simply means government 
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saving is negative.  Since economic repression discourages savings at the same time 
that it promotes overinvestment in capital-intensive industries, the chronic shortage of 
savings that results is thus what also explains the strong tendency towards current 
account deficits in such economies.  Since it is easier for the government than for the 
private sector to borrow abroad, there will be less crowding out of domestic 
investment if the government borrows abroad than if it borrows locally, and the 
current account deficit will only be larger. 
 
Large current account deficits are a problem because they will have to be matched 
by large current account surpluses in the future for the repayment of the debt 
accumulated to finance the deficits.  If in the future private savings fail to exceed 
private investment by enough produce those surpluses, the government must 
somehow come up with its own budget surpluses.  Hence, the more the government 
borrows abroad, the greater the current account deficit. 
 
When usury ceilings already keep deposit rates below equilibrium levels, the 
impact of the reserve tax must be entirely on loan rates.  By raising loan rates, the 
reserve tax only serves to soak up the rents accruing to the privileged borrowers who 
have access to cheap credit.  There is no exacerbation of distortions, for a tax on 
borrowing in a financially repressed economy is tantamount to a tax on a rationed 
good, the demand for which must then be effectively inelastic.  For this reason, heavy 
reliance on the reserve tax for financing the budget deficit is justified. 
 
Since the reserve tax is only a second-best measure, however, care must be 
exercised to see to it that the tax is phased out as soon as liberalization is achieved, at 
which point currency creation and open-market borrowing become the preferred 
instruments for financing the budget deficit. 
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4.6 Evaluating the Philippine Record 
 
In terms of  the above analysis, the Philippines should have resorted to the reserve 
requirement much more than it did between 1970 and 1981, since in most of those 
years there was financial and trade repression.8  Instead the favorite method during 
this period was foreign borrowing, followed by domestic open-market borrowing.  
These policies must have imposed a severe tax on savings, not to mention the strain 
on the countrys capacity to maintain adequate foreign reserves. 
 
Of course, it must have been the stabilization problem that was the major concern 
of policymakers at that time.  Ideally, policy should strike a balance between the short 
run concerns of stabilization and the longer term concerns of efficiency.  In other 
words, the reserve requirement should not have always been the measure resorted to 
in financing the budget deficit, but it certainly should have been used much more on 
the average. 
 
5. Optimal Deficit Finance After Liberalization 
 
Once the major distortions of interest repression and tariff protection are removed, the 
distortions imposed by the deficit taxes themselves will become the important ones.  Of 
course some other market imperfections will remain, such as those arising from transactions 
costs or from small investment indivisibilities, but these can be considered minor.  Their 
effects would simply be to bring demand or supply elasticities closer to zero, following the 
Le Chatelier Principle (Samuelson 1947, pp. 36-46), and they would be properly reflected in 
the measurement of the deadweight losses from the deficit taxes. 
 
Moreover, in a credit market free from interest repression, the reserve requirement 
becomes patently the most distortionary of the four methods of deficit finance.  The reason 
for this is that while the other methods are effectively taxes on final goods, the reserve 
requirement, as a tax on financial intermediation, is a tax on what is really an intermediate 
                                                 
8 The liberalization program started only in 1981. 
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good.  In this regard, we invoke the following argument by Peter Diamond and James 
Mirrlees (1971, p.24): 
 
 In the absence of profits, taxation of intermediate goods  must be  
Reflected in changes in final-good prices.  Therefore the revenue  
could have been collected by final-good taxation, causing no greater  
changes in final-good prices and avoiding production inefficiency. 
 
 
As we have pointed out, the way the reserve requirement causes production inefficiency is by 
driving a wedge between deposit rates and loan rates and thereby creating disparities in 
marginal rates of transformation in the economy. 
 
If we rule out the use of the reserve requirement because of the production distortion 
it alone entails, we will be left with just the choice between the inflation tax and open-market 
borrowing.  The distinction between domestic open-market borrowing and foreign borrowing 
loses its importance once financial and trade liberalization is complete.  Both measures will 
have the effect of a tax n savings.  Hence we shall proceed to derive a financing rule that 
minimizes only the distortion from the inflation tax and the tax on the future that is used to 
service present public borrowing. 
 
5.1. The Capital Market 
 
To keep the analysis simple, let us work with just two periods, the present and the 
future.  In this framework, a household can, by the act of investment, transform 
present resources into a future composite good we shall call future wealth.  In Figure 
2, the transformation technology is represented by the curve TT.  The opportunities 
for lending and borrowing provided by the capital market are represented by the line 
AD, which has a slope of  - (1 + r), where r is the real interest rate. 
 
To maximize the present value of its wealth, the household produces at point B, 
which entails an investment of GT in present resources and which yields OF in future 
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wealth.  To maximize its utility, this household consumes at point E, where the 
market opportunities line is tangent to the indifference curve UU.  This point of 
tangency consists of present consumption of OC and future wealth of OZ. 
 
The household in this example is a lender.  The amount of lending is CG and the 
loan payment is FZ.  If the household were a borrower instead, its indifference map 
would be such that the utility-maximizing point of tangency with the market 
opportunities line would be somewhere between points B and D. 
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For convenience, let us assume for the time being a perfect capital market.  By 
this we simply mean that there prevails a single real interest rate faced by both 
lenders and borrowers and that this rate is fixed exogenously.9  This assumption can 
be relaxed later.  In what follows, we introduce money balances, public debt, inflation 
and a tax on future wealth. 
 
5.2    Household Welfare 
 
In a perfect capital market, it makes no difference to the analysis of household 
welfare whether we look at a lender or at a borrower.  Let us then just look at a 
lender.  Let us assume that this household start with a present endowment of y0, 
which it divides between present consumption c, present real money balances m, 
lending h, and direct investment k.  This allocation yields future wealth of  
 
(1)  z = (1 -   [f(k)  +  (1- π)m  +  (1  r)h] 
 
where f(k) is direct production of future wealth,  τ  the tax rate on future wealth,  
π  the anticipated inflation rate, and  r  the real interest rate.  The proceeds from the 
wealth tax are what was used to service public debt.  As specified, this tax is fairly 
benign in that it distorts only relative prices between periods and not within periods. 
 
Real money balances are assumed to be an argument in the households utility 
function to represent the advantage of liquidity.  Thus this household maximizes the 
utility function U(c, m, z) subject to the endowment constraint  y0 = c + m + h + k.  
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are 
 
 Uc 
 ―  =  (1  τ)f1 
 Uz 
 
 
                                                 
9 We can assume, for example, a small open economy with the real interest rate fixed by the international 
capital market. 
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 Um 
 ―  =  (1  τ)  (f1  1 + π) 
 Uz 
 
 f1  =  1 + r 
 
 
in addition to the endowment constraint.10 
  
From those first-order conditions we can derive the households demand for 
present consumption, present real balances, and future wealth.  The most useful way 
to proceed is to note that those conditions make the marginal rate of substitution 
between two goods equal to the ratio of the prices of the goods.  If we then select the 
present consumption good as the numeraire by setting its price equal to one, the 
resulting prices for present real balances and for future wealth are respectively 
 
         r + π 
q  ≡            
  1 + r 
 
                    1 
 p  ≡   
         (1  τ) (1 + r) 
 
 
With these prices, the households maximization problem is equivalent to       
maximizing U(c, m, z) subject to w = c + qm + pz, where w = y0  k + (1 + r)-1 f and 
f1 = 1 + r. 
 
Hence we can write the households demands as c = c(q, p, w), m = m(q, p, w), 
and z = z(q, p, w).  The effects of π and τ can then be traced through their effects on 
the prices q and p.  The advantage of this formulation is that it allows us to work with 
demands that have the familiar properties of standard demand functions.  These are 
properties we will soon find useful. 
 
                                                 
10 We take for granted the second-order conditions that assume a maximum. 
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  To examine household welfare, we can reinsert the demands c, m, and z into the 
utility function and write the indirect utility function  V = V(q, p, w).  We can then 
apply Roys identifies or the Antonelli equations Vq= λm and Vp = λz, where  λ  is the 
marginal utility of income, to derive the welfare effects 
 
             - λm 
 Vπ  =    
             1 + r 
 
                   - λz 
 Vτ  =    
            (1 - τ)2  (1 + r) 
 
What is shown is that the marginal welfare loss from inflation is proportional to the 
demand for real balances and that the marginal welfare loss from the wealth tax is 
proportional to the demand for future wealth. 
 
5.3    Specifying Revenues 
 
We assume the government has a present budget deficit which is to be financed 
by inflation and by public borrowing.  Given the inflation rate  π  and the tax rate  τ , 
we specify the revenue available for deficit finance to be  
 D = qm + τpz 
where D is total revenue per household in units of present consumption and the other 
variables are as defined before. 
 
Here the revenue from the inflation tax is specified to be qm = (r + π) m/ (1 +  r). 
This form of seigniorage revenue is equivalent to the honest government revenue 
from money creation (Auernheimer 1974) and can also be shown to be the 
specification that assures a time-consistent monetary policy (see Appendix).  Such a 
specification makes the inflation tax completely analogous to a tax on a good 
produced at no cost.  The after-tax price of that good in this case is q and the tax base 
is m. 
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In the case of the wealth tax, the future proceeds of the tax amount to τz/(1 -  τ).  
Since the deficit to be financed is in the present, the government first borrows the 
funds.  The amount of borrowing the wealth tax can support is simply τz/(1  τ)(1 + r) 
=  τpz.   
 
5.4  The Optimal Policy Mix 
 
We wish to choose policy so as to maximize the welfare of a representative 
household subject to financing a given deficit.  This is the same thing as minimizing 
the deadweight loss from the distortions imposed by deficit finance.  To simplify 
matters, assume further that there are no other taxes and no other sources of income, 
so that the deficit is really total government spending. 
 
The problem is then to maximize with respect to  π and τ   the Lagrangean 
 
 L  =  V(q, p, w)  µ[D(q, p, w)  D0] 
 
where D0 is the given deficit.  The first-order conditions for an interior solution are 
 -λm  =  µ(m + qmq + τpzq) 
(1) 
 -λz  =  µ(qmp + z + τpzp) 
 
in addition to the deficit financing constraint D = D0.  Expressed in terms of 
elasticities, these conditions are  
 
 -λqm  =  (qm + qmemm + τpzezm) 
(2) 
 -λpz  =  (qmmz + pz + τpzezz) 
 
where eij is the elasticity of the demand for good i  with respect to the price of good  j. 
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To simplify these conditions, we can turn to the familiar properties of demand 
functions.  Specifically we  can use the Slutsky equation 
 
 eij  =  єij  σjηi  , 
 
the symmetry condition 
 
  σiєij  =  σjєji  , 
  
and the zero-homogeneity property 
 
  єmc + єmm + єmz = 0 
  єzc +  єzm + єzz  = 0 
 
where  єij is the elasticity of the compensated demand for good  I  with respect to the 
price of good  j,  ηi   is the income elasticity of good  i, and σi   is the fraction of the 
households income that it allocates to good  i.   
 
Using the above properties of demand functions allows us to reduce (2) to  
 
           -(єmm + єzz) - єzc 
(3) τ  =   
           -(єmm + єzz) - єmc 
 
in which it can be shown that both the numerator and denominator are positive.  This 
condition  together with the financing constraint D = D0 determines the optimal 
combination of  π  and  τ  and the corresponding optimal division of the deficit 
between inflationary finance and debt finance. 
 
That (3) can be expressed entirely in terms of compensated demand elasticities is 
significant.  It means that income effects are completely irrelevant to optimal deficit 
finance.  This is a result due to the assumption of a perfect capital market.  In such a 
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market one tax has just the same income effect as any other tax, so income effects all 
cancel out in a tradeoff between taxes. Tax distortions then depend only on 
substitution effects.  But as soon as we consider market imperfections, we will have 
to accept the complications of income effects. 
 
A closer examination of (3) will show that optimal deficit finance depends on the 
relative degree of complementarity between present consumption and present 
holdings of real balances and between present consumption and future wealth.  When  
єmc  <  єzc,  present consumption and present balances are closer complements than are 
present consumption and future wealth, and only then  ćc  we have  τ  <  1, or a 
positive inflation tax, at the optimum.  In general, the greater the degree of 
complementarity between consumption and real balances the higher the optimal 
inflation rate and the lower the optimal tax rate on future wealth.  This accords with 
the result reached by Corlett and Haque (1953) that we should tax more heavily goods 
that are complementary with the untaxed good.  In their case, leisure is the untaxed 
good; here it is present consumption. 
 
6. Estimating the Parameters for the Financing Rule 
 
This section reports an attempt to estimate the parameters needed to implement the 
optimal tax rule for deficit financing.  As derived in the last section, this rule can be stated in 
terms of the optimal tax rate on future wealth as  
 
             єzm  -  єmm 
 (31)   τ*  =   
           єmz   -  єzz 
 
where    is the elasticity of the compensated demand for good  i  with respect to the price of 
good  j,  z  in this case representing future wealth and  m  present real balances. 
 
To estimate the above elasticities we need to estimate demand functions for money 
and for future wealth in the special way these functions were formulated in the last section.  
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What is special about that formulation is the specification of the prices of real balances and 
of future wealth as respectively 
 
            r +  τ 
  q  ≡   
            1 + r 
 
                     1 
  p  ≡    
           (1  τ)(1 + r) 
 
where present consumption is taken to be numeraire,  r  is the real interest rate,  π  is the 
expected inflation rate, and  τ   is the expected tax rate on future wealth associated with the 
debt servicing of present public borrowing.  In addition to these two price arguments, the 
demand functions contain the usual permanent income or wealth argument which itself  
depends on expectations.  Hence we must first grapple with the problem of expectations. 
 
6.1 The Formation of Expectation 
 
Agents in the economy are seen to somehow form their expectations on the basis of 
information available from past periods.  Here we model these expectations as arising 
from a vector autoregression process of the form 
  ^   
 (4) xt  =  a0  +  a1xt-1  +  a2xt-2 
  
where xt is a vector representing the inflation rate, the tax rate on future wealth, and 
income at period  t, with the  ^  denoting expectation. 
 
The system (4) can be interpreted as the reduced form of the model of the economy 
that the agents perceive.  Since we have left the structural model itself unspecified, we 
make no restrictions on (4), except to limit ourselves to two lags so as not to exhaust 
degrees of freedom.  Besides, the testing of restrictions in a vector autoregression such as 
(4) is quite complicated because it involves considering the impact of the restrictions on 
the system as a whole instead of on just each individual equation (Sims 1980).  Rather 
 27 
than go through such a testing procedure, we shall accept our estimates as reasonable as 
long they generate expectations that yield the theoretically correct signs on the demand 
functions. 
 
The best results we obtained are presented in Table 6.1.  The inflation rate variable 
was computed as  πt = In (WPIt/WPIt-1)  where WPI is the Wholesale Price Index.  The 
tax rate variable was computed as πτ  = ∆Bt/St  where ∆Bt  is the amount of  non-
monetized debt issue and   St  is aggregate private savings.  Finally, the income variable 
was computed as  ẃt = yt + qtmt  where  yt  is real GNP, qt = it/(1 + it) is the imputed price 
of liquidity services using the nominal interest rate on time deposits, and mt is real 
currency in circulation plus real excess reserves.  Such a construction of variables is what 
comes out  of the theoretical framework presented in Section 5.  In the vector 
autoregression itself the wealth variable is in logarithmic form while the inflation rate and 
tax rate variables are not.  The predicted values from such a formulation, when used as 
the expectational variables, turned out to produce the best fitting demand functions with 
the theoretically correct signs. 
 
 
 Table 6.1  A Vector Autoregression in the Inflation Rate, the Implied Tax Rate  
                  on Future Wealth, and Income, 1970-1981 
 
 
Lagged Variables 
 
Dependent Variables 
                   πt                                τt                                 In Wt                   
 
πt-1 
 
 
πt-2 
 
 
τt-1 
 
 
 
τt-2 
 
 
           0.09      
          (0.35)     
 
          -0.31   
          (0.23) 
 
          -0.20 
          (0.14)     
 
 
          -0.03 
          (0.10) 
 
            -0.68 
            (0.57) 
 
            -0.28 
            (0.38) 
 
            -0.48 
            (0.23) 
 
 
            -0.19 
            (0.27) 
 
           -0.33 
           (0.28) 
 
             0.44 
            (0.19) 
 
             0.05 
            (0.11) 
 
 
           -0.04 
           (0.13) 
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ln Wt-1 
 
 
ln Wt-2 
 
 
Standard error 
of estimate 
 
Sample size 
 
 
         -0.68 
         (0.49) 
 
          0.64 
         (0.45) 
 
          0.07 
 
 
             22 
 
            -1.58 
            (0.79) 
 
             1.55 
            (0.74) 
 
             0.11 
 
 
                22 
 
             0.85 
            (0.39) 
 
             0.14 
            (0.36) 
 
              0.05 
 
 
                 22 
 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Semestral data from Central Bank 
and National Economic and Development Authority bulletins were used.  The 
variables were defined as:  πt = ln (WPIt/WPIt-1), τt = ∆Bt/St,  and  wt =  yt   = qtmt,  
where WPIt  is the Wholesale Price Index,  ∆Bt  is the amount of non-monetized 
debt issue by the national government,  St  is personal and corporate savings,  yt  is 
real GNP,  qt  is  it/(1+it)  with  it  as the nominal interest rate on time deposits, 
and  πt  is real currency in circulation plus real excess bank reserves. 
 
 
 
6.2     Estimating the Demand Functions 
 
Since it is data on nominal rather than real interest rates that are available, we use 
the fact that 1 + rt = (1  πt)(1 + it)  to get 
 
               it 
 qt  =   
           1 + it 
 
                           1 
 pt  =    
            (1  τt)(1  πt)(1 + it) 
 
where  it  is the nominal interest rate.  In our estimates, we use the interest rate on time 
deposits for it.  For  mt  we use real  currency in circulation plus real excess reserves, and 
zt we derive from  st = ptzt  where  st  is real savings. 
 
Assuming sluggish adjustment in the demands mt and zt to desired levels, we get 
equations (a) and (d) in Table 6.2.  The coefficients on ln mt-1 and  ln zt-1  indicate 
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adjustment  coefficients of 91 percent for real balances and 90 percent for future wealth 
within a semester.  At the 5 percent level of significance, the null hypothesis of 100 
percent adjustment cannot be rejected in either case.  The P statistics also indicate 
acceptance of the null hypothesis that the right-hand side variables do not explain 
demands. 
 
We reestimated the demand functions by dropping the lagged terms, thus assuming 
complete adjustment to desired levels within a semester and obtained equations (b) and 
(e) in the table. 
 
Table 6.2 Estimated Demand Functions for Real Currency and Future Wealth 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 
Equations for  ln  mt 
      (a)                (b)               (c) 
 
Equations for ln  zt 
      (d)               (e)               (f) 
 
Constant 
   
qt    
 
 
ln qt 
 
 
pt 
 
 
ln pt 
 
 
ln wt 
 
 
ln mt-1 
 
 
ln zt-1 
 
 
F 
 
 
     4.58 
 
   -3.15 
   (5.82) 
 
 
 
 
   -0.48 
   (0.26) 
 
 
 
 
    0.44 
   (0.53) 
 
    0.09 
   (0.27) 
 
    
 
 
  2.51 
 
 
     4.54 
 
   -3.56 
   (4.87) 
 
 
 
 
   -0.40 
   (0.18) 
 
 
 
 
    0.53 
   (0.41) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     3.51 
 
 
     3.16 
 
 
 
 
    -0.25 
    (0.36) 
 
 
 
 
   -0.46 
    (0.20) 
 
     0.54 
    (0.42) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     3.68 
 
 
    -2.05 
 
    -6.90 
  (10.70) 
 
 
 
 
   -0.60 
   (0.43) 
 
 
 
 
    3.35 
   (0.94) 
 
 
 
 
     0.10 
    (0.25) 
 
     2.66 
 
 
    -1.85 
 
    -3.99 
  (10.47) 
 
 
 
 
    -0.43 
    (0.39) 
 
 
 
 
    1.38 
   (0.89) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     3.51 
 
 
  -0.27 
 
 
 
 
  -0.02 
  (0.77) 
 
 
 
 
 -0.54 
 (0.44) 
 
   1.11 
  (0.91) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   3.46 
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_ 2 
R 
 
S.E. 
 
  0.22 
 
  0.11 
     
     0.25 
 
     0.11 
     
     0.27 
 
     0.11 
    
     0.24 
 
     0.23 
     
     0.25 
 
     0.23 
   
   0.25 
 
   0.23 
 Note:  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Semestral data were used. 
 
 
This time the P statistics indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the right-hand side 
variables do not explain demand in either case.  However, the estimated coefficients 
imply elasticities of demand that are not altogether that different from the long-run 
elasticities implied by the previous set of estimates.  Since the coefficient of  qt  in  ln mt 
is negative, the coefficient of  pt  in  ln zt is negative, and the coefficients of  ln wt  in both 
equations are positive, we do have the signs we would expect for normal goods.  What is 
striking about our results here is that the coefficients of  pt  in  ln mt  and of  qt  in  ln zt 
are both negative, implying the real balances and future wealth are in fact complements. 
Equations  (c) and (f) in the table are a third set of estimates.  The difference between 
this set and the others is that here the price arguments are in logarithms so that we get 
constant price elasticities.  Moreover, the signs and the orders of magnitude of the 
estimates are not very different from the others.  This third set of estimates is what we 
shall use for our illustrative calculations because of the convenience of constant 
elasticities. 
 
6.3  Applying the Elasticities 
 
Based on equations ( c) and (d) in Table 6.2, we now present illustrative calculations 
to determine the optimal division of the financing of a budget deficit between the 
inflation tax and a tax on the future in a liberalized economy.  We have the following 
uncompensated price elasticities: 
 
  emm =  -0.24   emz  = -0.46 
  ezm   =  -0.02   ezz   = -0.54 
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 and the following income elasticities 
  nm  = 0.54   nz  = 1.11 
 
The price elasticities show that we do have downward sloping demand schedules and that 
real balances and future wealth are complements.  The income elasticity for real balances 
supports the inventory model of the demand for money, while the other income elasticity 
indicates that future wealth is something of a luxury good. 
 
The Slutsky equation  εij = eij + θjni  then allows us to derive the compensated price 
elasticities.  For the income shares of real currency balances and future wealth we 
obtained for 1981 εm = 0.01  and θz = 0.09 respectively.  The resulting compensated 
elasticities are then  
 
  εmm = -0.24   εmz = -0.41 
 εzm = -0.01   εzz  = -0.44 
 
If we now plug those elasticities into our formulat (3), we get  τ* = 7.67.  What we really 
have here is a corner solution, since  τ  cannot possibly exceed unity.  Operationally, this 
means we should finance all of the deficit by means of open-market borrowing.  Indeed 
this also means letting the price level fall at the rate of the prevailing real interest rate, 
following Friedmans full-liquidity rule, so we would not have an inflation tax. 
 
      These calculations, however, are very sensitive to estimated elasticities.  Given our 
standard errors, those estimates are not very precise.  Moreover, those demand functions 
were estimated separately without imposing any of the Slutsky restrictions across 
equations that demand functions are supposed to follow. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The main results of the study may be summarized as follows: 
 
(a) Between 1970 and 1981, close to 16 perent of the budget deficit was financed by 
the creation of base money, that is, by the Central Bank holding government debt.  
However, 9 percent ended up as required bank reserves, so that only 7 percent of 
the deficit was financed by the creation of currency and excess reserves, on what 
we know as the printing of money. 
(b) Nearly 38 percent of the deficit was financed by domestic borrowing outside the 
Central Bank.  But 4 percent was in the form of eligible government securities 
which banks held a required reserves.  This means the total amount financed by 
the creation of required reserves was 13 percent.  Domestic open-market 
borrowing then financed 34 percent. 
(c) The rest of the deficit was therefore financed by foreign borrowing, this source 
accounting for 46 percent, by far the most important source of financing during 
the period. 
(d) The most erratic source of financing was currency creation, financing as much as 
33 percent and detracting by as much as 29 percent of the deficit.  The years of 
the big deficits were also the years in which the government turned heavily to 
foreign borrowing. 
(e) In the presence of trade and financial repression, particularly binding ceilings on 
interest rates, the reserve requirement is the best instrument for financing a budget 
deficit, since it is the only one we know that does not exacerbate the existing 
distortions.  This means the Philippines relied too much on domestic open-market 
borrowing and foreign borrowing, and too little on raising reserve requirements in 
the 12-year period of the study. 
(f) Once trade and financial liberalization has been achieved, the reserve requirement 
becomes the worst instrument to use since, in driving a wedge between deposit 
and loan rates, it is the only one that distorts production.  The inflation tax and 
open-market borrowing become the preferred instruments, with the tradeoff 
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between them depending on various elasticities of the demand for money and the 
demand for future wealth. 
(g) Our estimates of demand elasticities for real balances and future wealth, however, 
indicate that we should rely exclusively on open-market borrowing and follow 
Friedmans full-liquidity rule in avoiding the inflation tax. 
 
This study has focused on the purely efficiency aspect of financing a given budget 
deficit. Since policy should somehow reconcile goals of efficiency with goals of stabilization, 
there is a need to look more closely at the latter. At the same time, there is room for 
refinement of our results on the former, including trying to improve our estimates of the 
relevant parameters. 
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Appendix:  Specifying the Inflation Tax for Time Consistency 
 
 To illustrate how Auernheimers honest government revenue leads to time-consistent 
monetary policy, I use here a discrete-time model of money with perfect foresight.  In this 
example, the policy objective is to maximize the present value of the revenue stream, but it 
should be clear that the basic argument will apply also to an objective of welfare maximization. 
 
 The government issues money only at the start of each period, exchanging it for output at 
the price level prevailing in the period.  Thus if the government issues the nominal stock Mt  
Mt-1 at the start of period  t  and the price level is  Pt,  the conventional specification of real 
seigniorage is  Rt = (Mt  Mt-1)/Pt.  With Mt  then as money supply, the price level  itself is 
determined by the equilibrium condition  Mt/Pt = mt, where  mt is the real demand for money for 
the period.  To simplify, I assume that mt depends only on the inflation rate  πt  ≡  1  (Pt/Pt+1), 
where of course mt(πt) < 0. 
 
 Substituting the real demands  mt = Mt/Pt  and  mt-1 = Mt-1/Pt-1 and the inflation rate  πt-1 = 
1  (Pt-1/Pt)  now allows us to write 
 
  Rt = mt  (1  πt-1)mt-1 
          (A1)   
      = (mt  mt-1) + π t-1mt-1 
  
which is simply the discrete form of the conventional specification of seigniorage.  Note that 
there are two inflation rates in Rt,  namely,  πt  in  mt  and  πt-1  explicitly and in mt-1. 
 
 At  t = 1,  the government would like to choose (πl,  π2 ) to maxime 
 
           ∞         Rt 
  Z  =  Σ    
       t=1   (1+r)t-1      (A2) 
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where  r  is the given real discount rate.  This is a simple dynamic programming problem, that is, 
we choose a particular inflation rate  πt  by taking all inflation rates after period  t  as optimally 
given.  Hence, for an interior solution, the optimal inflation rate πt*  must satisfy 
  mt + (r + xt* )mt  = 0      (A3) 
 
for all  t  from period 1 on.  If at some future period,  t > 1, the government would choose an 
inflation rate to violate (A3), we have time inconsistency; if not, we have time consistency. 
 
 Suppose now the government does not arrive at some future period  s  and maximizes the 
present value of the revenue stream from that period on.  Note that by controlling the size of 
money issue at the start of the period, the government can in fact control  πs-1.  Indeed, given that 
Rs  is seigniorage for the period, the way this problem is typically formulated would have  πs-1 as 
the control variable for the period.  Raising   πs-1  does serve to raise Rs.  On the other hand, if we 
took  πs  as the control variable, we would get the bothersome result that raising the inflation rate 
only reduces seigniorage for the period, since ∂Rs/∂πs < 0.  
 
 However, differentiating  Rs  with respect to  πs-1  yields 
 
 ms-1  (1- πs-1)ms-1  >  0     (A4)  
 
 
which is always positive.  Therefore the government maximizes  Rs  by setting  πs-1 = 1.  This 
implies Ps = ∞,  which is essentially Calvos (1978) result.  Note that this is consistent with 
maximizing the present value of the revenue stream from period  s  on, since revenues after that 
period are constructed to be independent of   πs-1.  However, this is clearly inconsistent with 
(A3), and therefore we have a case of time inconsistency.  Inflation rates here would invariably 
be too high. 
 
 It may seem odd that the control variable we assign to period   s  is  πs-1, but that is 
precisely the point.  The source of time inconsistency here is the retroactivity of the inflation tax.  
It is a tax imposed on the holding of real balances in the previous period.  Under perfect 
foresight, however, the tax will be forestalled by money holders, so that it is the government that 
ends up paying it in the form of reduced seigniorage for the previous period.  Raising  πs-1  in the 
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effort to raise  Rs  only results in the reduction of  Rs-1.  But because in period  s  the government 
neglects that forerunning effect, it is led to time inconsistency. 
 
 Now suppose instead of  Rt  we define seigniorage for period  t  as 
 
                 r + πt 
  St  =  (  ) mt.       (A5) 
                1 + r  
 
All that has really changed here is the accounting procedure for assigning revenues to periods; 
we would still have the same maximand  since 
   
           ∞         St 
  Z  =  Σ                    , 
              t =1    (1+r)t-1   
  
 
except that for period 1, we would have  
 
                r + π1 
  S1 =   (            )m1  -  (1  π0)m0. 
               1 + r 
 
But the extra term,  -(1  π0)m0,  is there only because we started by specifying  Z  in terms of  
Rt.  We can always exercise our one degree of freedom in specifying initial conditions to assume 
the term away.  In any case, the term will not matter for the choice of inflation rates from period  
1  on. 
 
 Note that  St  is simply the discrete form of Auernheimers honest-government revenue.  
The virtue of this specification is that it leads to time consistency.  The control variable for 
period  s must now be  πs.  There is, after all, no other inflation rate in  Ss.  This time, 
maximizing  Ss  yields 
 
  ms + (r + πs)ms =  0      (A6) 
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which is precisely condition (A3) for maximizing  Z.  When the government does arrive at 
period  s  and it uses the specification  St, it will still opt for the same inflation rate it would have 
chosen from the beginning for that period.  In other words, we now have time consistency. 
 
 Time consistency is gained because the use of   Sτ  takes away from the government 
discretion over a retroactive tax.  In period  s,  the government is prevented from using  πs-1.  As 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) pointed out, the resolution of time inconsistency involves a 
precommitment.  Here the government at the start of period  s  precommit itself to an inflation 
rate  πs for the period.  As in Lucas and Stokey (1983), it is a precommitment to a price path. 
 
 Such a precommitment is formally equivalent to the maintenance of a sinking fund.  At 
the start of each period  t,  the government allocates (1  πt)mt/1 + r)  to a sinking fund earning 
the real return r, while appropriating for its own uses (r + πt)mt/(1 + r) as seigniorage for the 
period.  This means that while actual money issue yields only mt  (1 πt-1)mt-1  in resources, the 
government must have on hand  mt  to divide between the sinking fund and its seigniorage claim.  
But the government will indeed have that amount, since it will inherit (1 πt-1)mt-1  from the 
previous periods sinking fund. 
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